European security now depends on stability across the Mediterranean, North Africa and the Sahel, prompting NATO to extend its strategic focus south as well as to the alliance's eastern flank. What changes is less a new guarantee under Article 5 than a programme of security engagement intended to prevent turmoil south of Europe from translating into vulnerabilities inside Europe.
For much of the period since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, NATO’s priorities appeared overwhelmingly eastern, centred on Poland, the Baltic states, Finland and the Black Sea. That orientation is shifting because a separate strategic arc has opened across the Mediterranean, North Africa, the Sahel and the Middle East, where collapsing states, insurgencies, migration pressures and external competition now overlap.
A 2026 European Parliament briefing frames this area as a single strategic space increasingly interconnected with developments in the Sahel. Jihadist organisations remain active in parts of the Sahel, Libya is politically divided, Sudan’s conflict has created a new zone of instability, and maritime routes through the Mediterranean, Red Sea and approaches to the Suez Canal have grown more exposed to geopolitical disruption. Migration, arms trafficking and organised crime criss-cross the region without regard for borders.
Russia has become the most immediate geopolitical factor in NATO’s southern calculations. As several governments scaled back security cooperation with France and other Western partners, Moscow expanded ties across the Sahel. Russian personnel associated with the Africa Corps and Wagner-linked structures have operated in Mali and Libya, and Russia has pursued security relationships elsewhere on the continent. Those links offer Moscow access to governments, airfields, ports and mineral resources that extend its strategic reach and reduce Western influence, presenting NATO planners with pressure points on both the eastern and southern flanks.
China’s approach in Africa looks different, centred on infrastructure, military education, defence exports, telecommunications and commercial investment rather than direct intervention. The People’s Liberation Army’s support base in Djibouti is the clearest military footprint, while ports and dual-use communications networks create long-term strategic options beyond that single facility.
Geography makes Italy NATO’s southern anchor. Positioned between continental Europe, North Africa and the eastern Mediterranean, Italy’s ports, naval facilities and command infrastructure already host Allied Joint Force Command Naples and the NATO Strategic Direction-South Hub. Established in 2017, the Hub works not only on military intelligence but also with governments, researchers, civil society and international organisations to assess terrorism, governance, climate pressures and human security. Facilities such as Taranto are gaining importance as NATO strengthens its Mediterranean posture.
The Mediterranean is returning to a central strategic role. Russia retains maritime interests in the sea even as Syria has complicated previous basing arrangements, and China is building blue-water naval capability alongside broad commercial stakes. Instability in the Red Sea and the Middle East has shown how quickly conflict can disrupt shipping, so NATO’s southern strategy will increasingly incorporate maritime considerations. The alliance must now balance hardened deterrence in the east with sustained security engagement to the south, a shift that will shape NATO-African relations through the remainder of the decade.
